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United States v. Lopez:

Artificial Respiration for
the Tenth Amendment
I. INTRODUCTION

Conventional wisdom dictates that national problems require national
solutions. Gun-related school violence is one such problem that has
reached epidemic proportions.' Five years ago, Congress responded by
enacting the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990 (hereinafter section
922(q)), 2 which made it a federal offense for anyone to possess a
firearm within 1000 feet of a school. The Act was seemingly consistent
with Congress' trend of federalizing criminal law.' In United States v.
Lopez,5 however, the constitutionality of section 922(q) was challenged
on grounds that Congress exceeded its authority under the Commerce

1. Senator Lautenberg of New Jersey recently noted, "Every day 14 American children-14 kids here in America-are killed by guns." 140 CONG. REC. S12,806 (daily
ed. Sept. 13, 1994) (statement of Sen. Lautenberg). He added that "according to the
National Education Association, more than 100,000 students pack a gun with their
school things every morning." Id. at S12,807. Data from the national school-based
Youth Risk Behavior Survey showed that in 1991 approximately 26% of high school
students reported carrying a weapon. BUREAU OF STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 319 (Kathleen Maguire et al. eds., 1992).
Additionally, a nationwide survey of 2736 high school seniors from the Class of 1992
found that 91.6% worried "often" about crime and violence. Id. at 215.
2. Pub. L. No. 101-647, 104 Stat. 4789, 4884-85 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)
(1995)).
3. 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(2)(A) provides, in pertinent part: "It shall be unlawful for
any individual knowingly to possess a firearm at a place that the individual knows,
or has reasonable cause to believe, is a school zone." A "school zone" is defined as
"(A) in, or on the grounds of, a public, parochial or private school; or (B) within a
distance of 1000 feet from the grounds of a public, parochial or private school." 18
U.S.C. § 921(a)(25) (1988).
4. See Stephen Chippendale, Note, More Harm Than Good: Assessing Federalization of Criminal Law, 79 INN. L. REv. 455, 455-56 (1994) (noting that the current
federal criminal code includes more than 3000 offenses); see also Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, Seen in a Glass Darkly: The Future of the Federal Courts, 1993
WIS. L. REv. 1, 7 (1993) (asserting that "hardly a congressional session goes by without an attempt to add new sections").
5. 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995).
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Clause,6 calling into question the future of federal regulation in a range
of areas.7
The Constitution grants Congress specific enumerated powers, one of
which is the power to regulate interstate commerce.8 The United States
Supreme Court greatly expanded the scope of this power during the
New Deal era. As a result, congressional authority under the Commerce Clause emerged as virtually unlimited,"° thus weakening the reservation of power to the states under the Tenth Amendment." This
tension between the Commerce Clause and the Tenth Amendment was
at the heart of the great federalist debate in Lopez, which resulted in a
five to four ruling that section 922(q) went beyond the scope of
Congress' delegated authority. 2
This Note will examine the Court's decision in Lopez and discuss its
implications for future Commerce Clause analysis. Part II traces the
history of the Court's interpretation of Congress' commerce power."
Part III presents the facts and procedural history of Lopez,'4 followed
by an analysis of the majority, concurring, and dissenting opinions in
Part IV.5 Part V then considers the judicial, legislative, and social impacts of Lopez.'6 Part VI concludes with a look at how this ruling will
hold up in future litigation.' 7

6. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. The Commerce Clause provides: "Congress shall
have Power . . . To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several
States, and with Indian Tribes." Id.
7. In addition to federalizing criminal law, Congress regularly exercises its commerce power to pass legislation on such matters as civil rights, agriculture, labor, and
environmental protection. Richard A. Epstein, The Proper Scope of the Commerce
Power, 73 VA. L. REv. 1387, 1387 (1987).
8. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
9. See discussion infra part I.C.
10. See Chippendale, supra note 4, at 460. In particular, criminal prosecution, an
area traditionally governed by the States, experienced an explosive proliferation of
federal statutes targeting what was ostensibly intrastate crime. Id. at 463. In repeatedly upholding these statutes, the Court nonetheless recognized that Congress' commerce power was not unlimited, thus implying that the Tenth Amendment was still
relevant. See Ronald A. Giller, Note, Federal Gun Control in the United States: Revival of the Tenth Amendment, 10 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 151, 154 (1994).
11. U.S. CONST. amend. X. The Tenth Amendment provides: "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are
reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." Id.
12. United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1634 (1995).
13. See intfra notes 18-92 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 93-103 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 104-68 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 169-228 and accompanying text.

17. See infra note 229 and accompanying text.
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II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A. The ConstitutionalConvention: Enumerated Powers and
Limited Government
When the Constitution's Framers adopted a scheme of enumerated
powers to define Congress' authority, they reassured various state ratifying conventions that the powers of the new federal government would
be limited to those enumerated in the Constitution and would be further limited by the Tenth Amendment.18 As James Madison, a principal
draftsman of the U.S. Constitution, wrote: "The powers delegated by the
proposed Constitution to the federal government are few and defined.
Those which are to remain in the State governments are numerous and
indefinite." 9
The enumeration of congressional powers was outlined in Article I,
Section 8 of the Constitution.2" In addition to the power "[tlo regulate
Commerce... among the several States," Congress was delegated the
power to lay and collect taxes, enact bankruptcy laws, coin money,
promote science and invention by granting patents and copyrights, declare war, and so on.2' The enumeration itself seems to make clear
that the Framers intended the federal government to be a government
of limited, not general, powers; otherwise, enumeration would not have
been necessary.22 Further evidence that these powers were intended to
be limited is the inclusion in the Bill of Rights of the Tenth Amendment, which provides that the federal government may exercise only
those powers delegated to it by the Constitution.'

18. Douglas W. Kmiec, Commerce, the Tenth Amendment, and Guns in School,
UPDATE ON LAW-RELATED EDUC., Nov. 1995, at 4 (noting that "[elight of the nine original states needed to ratify the Constitution did so only after requiring that a state-

ment of state sovereignty be added to the document").
19. THE FEDERAuST No. 45, at 292-93 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
20. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
21. Id.
22. It is also evident that the enumeration of powers was not merely illustrative
given that the Framers took care to distinguish the power to "raise and support Armies" from the power to "provide and maintain a Navy." Id.; see Gibbons v. Ogden,
22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 195 (1824) ("The enumeration presupposes something not enumerated. . . ."); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 155 (1992) ("[N]o one disputes the proposition that '[tihe Constitution created a Federal Government of limited
powers.'" (quoting Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 457 (1991))).
23. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
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As stated above, the power to regulate interstate commerce was
among those powers delegated to Congress. The need for commercial
regulation was, perhaps, the most important reason for the adoption of
the Constitution, given that under the Articles of Confederation, the
federal government was unable to prevent individual states from enacting tariffs and regulations that impeded the free flow of interstate commerce. 4 Thus, the original purpose of the Commerce Clause was not
so much a grant to Congress of a general police power, but rather a
means of eliminating trade barriers among the states." Much of the
early case law made this clear.26
B. 1824-1936: The Limits of CongressionalPower
Chief Justice Marshall first articulated the scope of Congress' commerce power in Gibbons v. Ogden." The Gibbons Court defined interstate commerce as "that commerce which concerns more States than
one."28 The Court further noted that the commerce power "may be exercised to its utmost extent, and acknowledges no limitations, other
than are prescribed in the constitution."29 Although this definition ap-

24. See 1

JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES

§ 259 (Da Capo Press 1970) (1833) ("[Tlhe want of any power in congress to regulate foreign or domestic commerce was deemed a leading defect in the confederation."); Roger Pilon, Freedom, Responsibility, and the Constitution: On Recovering
Our Founding Principles, 68 NOTRE DAME L REV. 507, 533-34 (1993) ("Under the
Articles of Confederation, state legislatures had become dens of special-interest legislation aimed at protecting local manufacturers and sellers from out-of-state competitors.").
25. See Pilon, supra note 24, at 534 ("[The Commerce Clause] was thus not so
much to convey a power 'to regulate'-in the affirmative sense in which we use that
term today-as a power 'to make regular' the commerce that might take place among
the states."); Donald H. Regan, The Supreme Court and State Protectionism: Making
Sense of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 84 MIcH. L.REv. 1091, 1125 (1986) (arguing
that the purpose of the commerce power "was not to empower Congress, but rather
to disable the states from regulating commerce among themselves").
26. See discussion infra part ll.B.
27. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). Gibbons involved a dispute over a New York
grant of a steamboat monopoly that affected navigation between New York and New
Jersey. Id. The Court struck down the monopoly, stating that it conflicted with a
federal statute licensing such interstate commerce. Id. at 190-91.
28. Id. at 194. Chief Justice Marshall observed that it would be a different case if
New York had regulated matters "completely internal, which is carried on between
man and man in a State, or between different parts of the same State, and which
does not extend to or affect other States." Id. Gibbons' distinction between "internal
commerce" and "interior traffic" was further articulated in The Daniel Ball, which
upheld Congress' authority to require the licensing of ships operating exclusively intrastate so long as the ships were involved in the transportation of goods ultimately
destined for other states. 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557, 565 (1870).
29. Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 196. Chief Justice Marshall continued:
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peared to give Congress broad discretion in exercising its authority,0
for almost a century thereafter, the Court's Commerce Clause decisions
rarely involved the extent of Congress' power.' Rather, the Court
dealt almost exclusively with the validity of state actions that discriminated against interstate commerce.31
With the enactment of the Interstate Commerce Act in 1887 and the
Sherman Antitrust Act in 1890, Congress vastly expanded the potential
reach of federal law, and the Court faced new questions over the limits
of congressional power.3 The Court's approach to this legislation was
restrictive.'

For example, in United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 35 the

Court denied Congress the power to regulate activities such as "min-

If, as has always been understood, the sovereignty of Congress, though limited to specified objects, is plenary as to those objects, the power over commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States, is vested in Congress as absolutely as it would be in a single government, having in its constitution the same restrictions on the exercise of the power as are found in
the constitution of the United States.
Id. at 197.
30. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 5-4, at 306 (2d ed.
1988) (characterizing Gibbons as an extraordinarily broad interpretation of federal
power). For criticism, see Epstein, supra note 7, at 1399-1408 (maintaining that when
Gibbons is read as a whole, it is clear that Chief Justice Marshall did not intend to
give such an extensive reading to the reach of the Commerce Clause).
31. United States v. Lopez, 115 S. CL 1624, 1627; see TRIBE, supra note 30, § 5-4,
at 306 (observing that until the late 1800s, "commerce clause litigation only rarely
involved the Supreme Court in review of congressional actions").
32. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1627 (citing Veazie v. Moor, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 568, 573-75
(1853) (upholding a state-created steamboat monopoly because it involved regulation
of wholly internal commerce); Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U.S. 1, 17, 20-22 (1888) (upholding a state prohibition on the manufacture of intoxicating liquor because the commerce power "does not comprehend the purely domestic commerce of a State which
is carried on between man and man within a State or between different parts of the

same State")).
33. Lopez, 115 S. Ct at 1627. Prior to the Interstate Commerce Act and the
Sherman Act, congressional legislation was, for the first time, struck down as exceeding the commerce power in United States v. DeWitt, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 41 (1869)
(unanimous decision) (invalidating a federal law that sought to prohibit intrastate
sales of hazardous fuels). In DeWitt, the Court acknowledged that the Commerce
Clause "has always been understood as limited by its terms; and as a virtual denial
of any power to interfere with the internal trade and business of the separate
States." Id. at 44.
34. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1627.
35. 156 U.S. 1 (1895). In E.C. Knight, the Court declined to enforce federal antitrust laws in order to break up a monopoly of sugar manufacturing. Id. at 13.
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ing," "manufacturing," and "production," even though the products of
these activities would subsequently enter interstate commerce.' The
Court reasoned that the term "commerce" literally meant "trade," which
would exclude from the scope of the Commerce Clause any activities
that occurred before the products entered interstate trade." In addition, the Court made a distinction between those activities that directly
affected interstate commerce, and those that indirectly affected it, holding that the commerce power extended only to activities with a direct
effect on interstate commerce.'
These distinctions between manufacturing and commerce and between direct and indirect effects on interstate commerce were the cornerstone of the Court's "dual federalism" approach." This theory regarded the federal government and the separate states as two mutually
exclusive systems of sovereignty; both were supreme within their respective spheres, and neither could intrude upon the sovereignty reserved to the other.4" The Court encountered difficulties with this approach because the real world was rarely so neatly categorized." Nevertheless, up until 1937, the Court continued to use these formal distinctions to invalidate federal laws that sought to regulate areas of local
or state economic concern. a2

36. Id. at 12.
37. Id. ("Commerce succeeds to manufacture, and is not part of it."); see THE
FEDERALIST No. 11, at 63 (Alexander Hamilton) (Modern Library College ed. 1937) (using "commerce" as a synonym for "trade" and "navigation"); cf Carter v. Carter Coal
Co., 298 U.S. 238, 304 (1935) ("Mining brings the subject matter of commerce into
existence. Commerce disposes of it.").
38. E.C. Knight, 156 U.S. at 12.

39.
1993).

DAVID CRUMP ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

103 (2d ed.

40. Edward S. Corwin, The Passing of Dual Federalism, 36 VA. L. REV. 1, 4
(1950); see CRUMP ET AL., supra note 39, at 103 (noting that under a dual federalism

approach, states could regulate manufacturing, but Congress could not).
41. CRUMP ET AL., supra note 39, at 103; see Houston E. & W. Tex. Ry. v. United

States (The Shreveport Rate Case), 234 U.S. 342, 351 (1914) (acknowledging the interconnectedness of interstate and intrastate activities in holding that federal control of
intrastate railroad rates was proper under the Commerce Clause because intrastate
railroad rates had a "close and substantial relation" to interstate rates).
42. See Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 303-04 (1936) (invalidating the
Bituminous Coal Conservation Act of 1935 in part because the act regulated production rather than trade); United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 68 (1936) (invalidating the
Agricultural Adjustment Act because it invaded the reserved powers of the states);
A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 550 (1935) (striking
down the "Live Poultry Code" authorized by the National Industrial Recovery Act of
1933 because the regulated activity only indirectly affected interstate commerce).
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C. The New Deal Era: FederalAuthority Expanded
During the early 1930s, when the national economy slipped into the
Great Depression, many looked to the federal government to intervene." In response to this economic emergency, Congress and President Franklin D. Roosevelt began implementing the New Deal, which
resulted in a proliferation of federal regulations.' At first, the Court
resisted supporting the new regulations.45 For instance, in 1935 the
Court struck down as beyond the commerce power an industrial code
that regulated intrastate sales of diseased chickens." The Court observed: "Extraordinary conditions may call for extraordinary remedies.
But... [e]xtraordinary conditions do not create or enlarge constitutional power.... Such assertions of extra-constitutional authority were
anticipated and precluded by the explicit terms of the Tenth Amendment. ..

.

Two years later, the Court finally relented in the watershed decision
of NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.48 In the wake of President
Roosevelt's landslide re-election in 1936, and his infamous "court-packing" scheme,49 a narrow majority of the Court upheld the National Labor Relations Act, which extended federal jurisdiction to the regulation
of labor disputes at manufacturing facilities engaged in interstate commerce.' The Court ruled that Congress may regulate those intrastate

43.

GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

121 (11th ed. 1985).

44. Id.

45. Id. at 122-28.
46. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry, 295 U.S. at 551. Professor Crump and his co-authors
explained the industrial code in question as follows:
It prohibited the selling of uninspected or unfit birds, set minimum wages of
fifty cents an hour, set maximum hours of forty-eight per week, and regulated such odd practices as "straight killing" (the customer had to accept "run
of the coop," or birds selected by chance, rather than choose the best).
CRUMP ET AL., supra note 39, at 112.
47. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry, 295 U.S. at 528-29. Following the Schechter decision,

President Roosevelt accused the Court of taking a "horse and buggy" approach to addressing national economic problems. Louis FISHER & NEAL DEVINS, POLITICAL DYNAMICS OF CONSTrrUTIONAL LAW 86 (1992).

48. 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
49. See generally William E. Leuchtenburg, The Origins of Franklin D. Roosevelt's

"Court Packing" Plan, 1966 Sup. CT. REV. 347 (discussing Roosevelt's battle with the
Court in the early 1930s). President Roosevelt proposed reshaping the Court by adding six new justices-enough to give him the majority needed to uphold New Deal
legislation. Id. at 392. Congress eventually rejected the plan. Id. at 347.
50. Jones & Laughlin Steel, 301 U.S. at 49 (5-4 decision).
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activities that "have such a close and substantial relation to interstate
commerce that their control is essential or appropriate to protect that
commerce from burdens and obstructions."" The Court's definition of
commerce did not stress "commerce among the states" or "trade," but
rather focused on the interconnectedness of the national economy. 2
Thus, Jones & Laughlin Steel began the Court's systematic process of
erasing the previous limitations that had been placed on the scope of
the commerce power.'
Four years later, in United States v. Darby,' a unanimous Court
upheld the Fair Labor Standards Act, which regulated goods through
the imposition of a minimum wage.55 Darby marked the historical nadir for the restrictive effect of the Tenth Amendment, which the Court
referred to as an ineffective "truism."' Thus, the Court rejected the
idea that the Tenth Amendment acted as an independent limitation on
57
congressional authority over interstate commerce.
In subsequent decisions, the Court generally deferred to Congress on
the issue of whether a regulated activity had the requisite "substantial
relation" to interstate commerce, sometimes going to great lengths to
show that it did.' For example, in Wickard v. Filburn,' the Court

51. Id. at 37.
52. Id. at 37-39.
53. Id. at 40-41 (disregarding the distinctions used by the Court during the "dual
federalism" era); see Epstein, supra note 7, at 1443 ("The old barriers were stripped
away; in their place has emerged the vast and unwarranted concentration of power
in Congress that remains the hallmark of the modem regulatory state."); see also
Richard E. Levy, New York v. United States: An Essay on the Uses and Misuses of
Precedent, History, and Policy in Determining the Scope of Federal Power, 41 KAN.
L. REv. 493, 496 (1993) (stating that the Court, in the post-New Deal era, rarely addressed the detrimental effect of a federal law on state sovereignty and typically
limited its Commerce Clause analyses to "whether the federal action was within the
scope of federal power").
54. 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
55. Id. at 125. Darby expressly overruled Hanmer v. Dagenhart (The Child Labor
Case), 247 U.S. 251 (1918). Darby, 312 U.S. at 103. In Hammer, the Court struck
down a federal statute that prohibited the interstate sale of products made by child
labor. Hammer, 247 U.S. at 277. The Court reasoned that the statute unconstitutionally encroached upon the authority of the states because the employment of child labor did not directly affect interstate commerce. Id. at 276.
56. Darby, 312 U.S. at 124 ("The amendment states but a truism that all is retained which has not been surrendered.").
57. Id.
58. TRIBE, supra note 30, § 5-4.
59. 317 U.S. 111 (1942). In Wickard, an Ohio farmer named Filburn was prosecuted under the Federal Agriculture Adjustment Act, which authorized the establishment
of production quotas for wheat sold into interstate commerce as well as for wheat
consumed on the farm as food, seed, or feed for livestock. Id. at 114. Filburn produced 239 bushels of wheat in excess of his quota and refused to pay the subse-
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held that a federal statute could regulate a farmer's production of
wheat for home consumption, regardless of how trivial, because the
"cumulative effect" of his consumption, taken together with that of
many others, might alter the supply-and-demand relationships of the
interstate commodity market.'
In the 1960s, the Court granted Congress even more deference with
the development of the rational basis test.6' Under the test, where a
rational basis existed for concluding that a regulated activity substantially affected interstate commerce, the Court would defer to congressional wisdom and uphold the regulation. 2 The Court introduced this
test in Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States' when it upheld
federal civil rights legislation on grounds that Congress had a rational
basis for finding that racial discrimination affected interstate commerce.' The Court reiterated the test in Katzenbach v. McClung,
stating: "[W]here we find that the legislators, in light of the facts and
testimony before them, have a rational basis for finding a chosen regulatory scheme necessary to the protection of commerce, our investigation is at an end."'
Also during the 1960s, Congress, with great regularity, began resorting to its commerce power in enacting a variety of federal criminal
statutes." This practice gave rise to concerns that national power was

quently imposed penalty. Id. at 114-15.
60. Id. at 127-28.
61. CRump ET AL, supra note 39, at 130.
62. Id.
63. 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
64. Id. at 258. In Heart of Atlanta Motel, the defendant motel violated the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 by turning away blacks on the basis of their race. Id. at 242-43.
The Court stated that the only questions with regard to Congress' exercise of its
commerce power were: "(1) whether Congress had a rational basis for finding that
racial discrimination by motels affected commerce, and (2) if it had such a basis,
whether the means it selected to eliminate that evil are reasonable and appropriate."
Id. The Court took note of congressional findings that racial discrimination discouraged travel on the part of a substantial portion of the black community; consequently, such discrimination could be regulated by Congress in the aggregate. Id. at 252-53.
65. 379 U.S. 294 (1964). In Katzenbach, the defendant restaurant violated the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 by refusing to serve black patrons in its dining area. Id. at 295.
66. Id. at 303-04; see also Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n,
452 U.S. 264, 276 (1981) ("The court must defer to a congressional finding that a regulated activity affects interstate commerce, if there is any rational basis for such a
finding.").
67. See GUNTHER, supra note 43, at 151 (observing that "commerce-based criminal
laws received fresh impetus with the widely publicized war on crime that commenced

1371

being abused because criminal law was historically an area of local
concern.' The Court addressed this issue in Perez v. United States'
when it examined whether the commerce power extended to a federal
statute that criminalized loansharking. 0 The Court upheld the statute,
finding that loansharking belonged to a "class of activity" that substantially affected interstate commerce, even though the activity in question
was conducted on a purely local scale.7 In the aftermath of Perez,
courts employed the same lenient standard for reviewing commerce
power-based criminal statutes.'
D. The Last Two Decades: A Renewed Battle over State Sovereignty
State sovereignty under the Tenth Amendment made a brief comeback in 1976, when the Court, in National League of Cities v. Usery,73
ruled that the federal minimum wage law encroached upon a traditional
state function.74 In other words, the Court asserted that Congress
could not use the commerce power in ways that directly displaced the
states' ability to carry out functions that were historically governed by
the states, such as "fire prevention, police protection, sanitation, public
health, and parks and recreation." 75 Thus, the Court held that state
sovereignty interests placed a limit upon Congress' commerce power."
This signaled a revival of the Tenth Amendment, which, the Court noted, "expressly declares the constitutional policy that Congress may not
exercise power in a fashion that impairs the States'
integrity or their
77
ability to function effectively in a federal system."
Nine years later, however, National League of Cities was overturned.
In Garciav. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority,'8 the Court,
faced with the issue of whether the minimum wage law applied to the

in the 1960s").
68. Id. at 148.
69. 402 U.S. 146 (1971).
70. Id. at 147.

71. Id. at 153. The Court reasoned that loansharking as a whole had an effect on
interstate commerce because organized crime relied on loansharking revenues from
numerous local syndicates to finance its national operations. Id. at 157.
72. JOHN E. NowAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 115 (4th ed. 1991).

73. 426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth.,
469 U.S. 528 (1985).

74. Id. at 852. National League of Cities expressly overruled Maryland v. Wirtz.
Id. at 855. In Wirtz, the Court held that federal minimum wage standards applied to
local schools and hospitals. Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 194 (1968).
75. National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 851-52.

76. Id. at 842.
77. Id. at 843 (quoting Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 547 n.7 (1975)).
78. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
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municipal mass transit authority, found the "traditional state functions"
test unworkable.' The Court observed that "identifying which particular state functions are immune [from federal regulation] remains difficult."' For example, lower courts applying this standard from National League of Cities found that activities such as operating a highway
authority and licensing automobile drivers were traditionally subject to
state control, whereas operating a mental health facility and regulating
traffic were subject to federal control."' This distinction, noted the
Court, was "elusive at best. " ' With regard to state sovereignty concerns, the Court opined that the national political process would preserve state interests.3
In the principal dissent, Justice Powell criticized the majority for
"effectively reduc[ing] the Tenth Amendment to meaningless rhetoric
when Congress acts pursuant to the Commerce Clause."' In addition,
Justice Rehnquist, in a four-sentence dissent, predicted that the principles protected in National League of Cities would "in time again command the support of a majority of this Court."'
This foreshadowing by Justice Rehnquist was somewhat fulfilled in
New York v. United States' when the Court struck down a congressional regulatory scheme as an improper usurpation of state power.8 7 In

79. Id. at 546-47.
80. Id. at 538 (quoting San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth. v. Donovan, 557 F. Supp.
445, 447 (W.D. Tex. 1983)).
81. Id. at 538-39 (citations omitted).
82. Id. at 539.
83. Id. at 552; see Jesse H. Choper, The Scope of National Power Vis-d-Vis the
States: The Dispensability of Judicial Review, 86 YALE LJ. 1552 (1977) (arguing that
the issue of whether the federal government has encroached upon state sovereignty
should be treated as nonjusticiable, with the final resolution left to the political
branches). But see Garcia, 469 U.S. at 584 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (observing that
a number of changes in how Congress works-such as the direct election of Senators
under the Seventeenth Amendment and the expanded influence of national interest
groups-"lessened the weight Congress gives to the legitimate interests of States as
States"); Kmiec, supra note 18, at 6 ("[In essence, the Court] told members of Congress to be sensitive to federalism. Congress found itself unable to exercise much, if
any, self-restraint.").
84. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 560 (Powell, J., dissenting).
85. Id. at 579-80 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
86. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
87. Id. at 175-76. At issue in New York was a regulatory scheme in the Low-Level
Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985 that attempted to force each state
to make its own arrangements for disposing low-level radioactive waste generated in
that state. Id. at 174-75. Under one provision of the Act, any state that did not ar-
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discussing the constitutional balance between the states and the federal
government, the Court noted that the Commerce Clause and the Tenth
Amendment are essentially mirror images:
In the end, just as a cup may be half empty or half full, it makes no difference
whether one views the question at issue in this case as one of ascertaining the
limits of the power delegated to the Federal Government under the affirmative
provisions of the Constitution or one of discerning the core of sovereignty retained by the States under the Tenth Amendment.m

By restoring vitality to the Tenth Amendment, the Court reaffirmed that
the reach of the Commerce Clause is not unlimited.' Nevertheless, inconsistencies in the Court's decisions since the mid-1970s left unresolved
the extent to which the Tenth Amendment would impact future exercises
of Congress' commerce power.' Consequently, a dispute between the
Fifth and the Ninth Circuits arose over the constitutionality of the GunFree School Zones Act,9 and in Lopez, the Court was once again asked
to define the scope of the Commerce Clause.9'
III. FACTS OF THE CASE

On March 10, 1992, Alfonso Lopez, Jr., a high school senior from San
Antonio, Texas, came to school carrying a concealed .38-caliber handgun
and five bullets.93 Lopez planned to sell the gun to a classmate for use
in a "gang war" after school.' School authorities received an anonymous tip and confronted Lopez.95 Police subsequently arrested and
charged Lopez under Texas law with possessing a firearm on school
premises.'

range for waste disposal would be required to take title to the waste and would be
liable for damages in connection with the disposal of the waste. Id. The Court held
that this "take titie" provision was unconstitutional because "Congress may not simply
'commandee[r] the legislative processes of the States by directly compelling them to
enact and enforce a federal regulatory program.'" Id. at 161 (quoting Hodel v. Virginia
Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 288 (1981)).
88. Id. at 159.
89. Id. at 156.
90. Giller, supra note 10, at 162.
91. See United States v. Edwards, 13 F.3d 291, 294 (9th Cir. 1993) (recognizing
that by upholding the constitutionality of the Gun-Free School Zones Act, a conflict
would be created with the Fifth Circuit's opinion in United States v. Lopez, 2 F.3d
1342 (5th Cir. 1993), offd, United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995)).
92. United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1626 (1995).
93. Id. The gun was unloaded, but Lopez had five bullets with him. Lopez, 2 F.3d
at 1345.
94. Lopez, 2 F.3d at 1345.
95. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1626.
96. Id. (citing TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 46.03(a)(1) (West Supp. 1994)).
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The next day, the state dropped charges when federal authorities
charged Lopez with violating section 922(q), the Gun-Free School Zones
Act.97 Lopez moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that the statute
was unconstitutional as beyond the scope of congressional authority.'
The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas denied
the motion, holding that the statute "is a constitutional exercise of
Congress' well-defined power to regulate activities in and affecting commerce, and the 'business' of elementary, middle and high schools...
affects interstate commerce."' The district court then conducted a
bench trial in which Lopez was found guilty and sentenced to six
months' imprisonment and two years' supervised release."
On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit,
Lopez again challenged the constitutionality of section 922(q).'"' This
time, the court agreed with Lopez and reversed his conviction, holding
that the federal statute was "invalid as beyond the power of Congress
under the Commerce Clause."' °2 The United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari to determine whether Congress had the power to
criminalize carrying a gun within 1000 feet of a school. 3
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE COURT'S OPINION

A. The Majority Ruling
Invoking "first principles," Chief Justice Rehnquist"'4 began his analysis with James Madison's assertion that the Constitution creates a federal
government of "few and defined" powers and state governments of "numerous and indefiite" powers. 5 The Chief Justice noted that the

97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Lopez, 2 F.3d at 1345.
100. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1626
101. Id.
102. Id. (citing Lopez, 2 F.3d at 1367-68). The Fifth Circuit noted that the Tenth
Amendment was relevant insofar as "[olur understanding of the breadth of Congress'
commerce power is related to the degree to which its enactments raise Tenth
Amendment concerns, that is concerns for the meaningful jurisdiction reserved to the
states." Lopez, 2 F.3d at 1347.
103. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1626.
104. Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas joined Chief Justice Rehnquist
in the majority opinion. Id. at 1625.
105. Id. at 1626 (citing THE FEDERALIST No. 45, at 292-93 (James Madison) (Clinton
Rossiter ed., 1961)).
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Founders adopted this scheme "to ensure protection of our fundamental
liberties."" 6 Starting then with Gibbons, °7 Chief Justice Rehnquist
traced the history of the Court's Commerce Clause interpretation to modem precedent, focusing specifically on the Court's acknowledgment of
the inherent limits of federal power." a
Having established this framework, he identified "three broad categories of activity" subject to congressional regulation under the Commerce
Clause: (1) "the use of the channels of interstate commerce;" (2) the "instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or things in interstate
commerce," even where the threat arises only from intrastate activities;
and (3) activities that "substantially affect" interstate commerce.'" Dismissing the first two classifications as inapplicable to Lopez, the Chief
Justice concluded that the proper analysis was determining whether
section 922(q) "substantially affects" interstate commerce." '
Chief Justice Rehnquist first noted that the Court has upheld a wide
variety of legislation regulating intrastate economic activity when that
activity substantially affected interstate commerce."' He then observed
that "[elven Wickard, which is perhaps the most far reaching example of
Commerce Clause authority over intrastate activity, involved economic
activity in a way that the possession of a gun in a school zone does
not.""2 Thus, he reasoned, to hold that section 922(q) substantially affected interstate commerce would be inconsistent with this line of precedent."

3

Chief Justice Rehnquist's second observation was that section 922(q)
contained no jurisdictional element that would guarantee, on a case-by-

106. Id. (citing Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991)).
107. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
108. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1626-29. For example, Chief Justice Rehnquist called attention to the Court's acknowledgment in Gibbons that the enumeration of powers in
Article I "presupposes something not enumerated." Id. at 1627 (citing Gibbons v.
Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 195 (1824)).
109. Id. at 1629-30 (citations omitted).
110. Id. at 1630. Chief Justice Rehnquist rejected the lesser measure of "affects"
and held that Congress could not exercise its commerce power unless an activity
substantially affects interstate commerce. Id.
111. Id. (citing Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264,
268 (1981) (intrastate coal mining); Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 147 (1971)
(intrastate extortionate credit transactions); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 299301 (1964) (restaurants utilizing substantial interstate supplies); Heart of Atlanta Motel
v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 261 (1964) (inns and hotels catering to interstate
guests); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 128-29 (1942) (production and consumption
of home-grown wheat)).
112. Id. For a discussion of Wickard, see supra notes 59-60 and accompanying text.
113. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1630-31. Chief Justice Rehnquist also asserted that under
our federal system, the states have traditionally possessed primary authority over
education and criminal law enforcement. Id. at 1632.
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case basis, that the gun possession in question affected interstate commerce.'
As an illustration, he referred to United States v. Bass,"'
wherein the Court reversed a man's conviction under a federal statute
when the Court could not establish a sufficient nexus between the alleged crime of gun possession and interstate commerce."6 The Chief
Justice further noted the lack of congressional findings or legislative
history that would suggest section 922(q) had a sufficient link to interstate commerce." 7
Responding to the Court's principal dissent, Chief Justice Rehnquist
pointed out that Justice Breyer failed to identify any activity beyond the
scope of federal authority."8 He further opined that if Congress could,
as Justice Breyer suggested, regulate conditions that adversely affected
classroom learning, there would be nothing to prevent it from regulating
the educational
process directly or from mandating a federal curricu9
lum."1
The majority ruling, admitted the Chief Justice, gives rise to "legal
uncertainty."'20 He noted, however, that ever since Marbury v. Madison'2' determined that it was the judiciary's duty to "say what the law
is," "' such uncertainty has been inevitable.'" In sum, Chief Justice

114. Id. at 1631.

115. 404 U.S. 336 (1971).
116. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1631 (citing Bass, 404 U.S. at 347). The federal statute in
Bass made it a crime for a felon to "receiv[e], posses[s], or transpor(t] in commerce
or affecting commerce . . . any firearm." Bass, 404 U.S. at 337 (alterations in origi-

nal) (citing 18 U.S.C. app. § 1202(a) (repealed 1986)).
117. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1631-32. The Chief Justice added that although the absence
of such congressional findings is not dispositive, such findings may provide valuable
insight Id. It is important to note that Congress later amended § 922(q) to include
congressional findings regarding the effects of gun possession near schools upon
interstate commerce. Id. at 1632 n.4 (citing the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 320904, 108 Stat. 1796, 2125 (1995)).
The Government did not rely on the Act as a retroactive validation, but it insisted
that these findings indicated Congress' rationale for wanting to regulate gun possession near schools. Id.
118. Id. at 1632.
119. Id. at 1633. Chief Justice Rehnquist further suggested that Justice Breyer's
analysis would justify the federal regulation of family law, as even child rearing could
be rationally seen to "fall on the commercial side of the line." Id.
120. Id.
121. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
122. Lopez, 115 S.Ct. at 1633 (quoting Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177).
123. Id. Chief Justice Rehnquist pointed out that even in the landmark New Deal
decision of Jones & Laughlin Steel, the Court held that the question of Congress'
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Rehnquist refused to add up numerous inferences so as to transform
Congress' commerce power into a general police power, although he did
acknowledge that some of the Court's prior rulings have gone in that
direction.'24 Thus, the Fifth Circuit ruling was affirmed and section
922(q) was held to be an impermissible
expansion of federal authority
25
Clause.
Commerce
the
under
B. The Concurrences
1. Justice Kennedy
Justice Kennedy'26 joined the majority but maintained that the Court
had reached a limited holding.1 27 In tracing the history of Commerce
Clause decisions, Justice Kennedy noted two lessons relevant to Lopez:
(1) attempts to define the limits of Commerce Clause authority from
content-based or subject-matter distinctions alone give rise to imprecision and inconsistencies,'" and (2) the Court has an immense stake in
the stability of its Commerce Clause jurisprudence.'29 Thus, he emphasized, the Court must exercise judicial restraint so as not to revert "to an
understanding of commerce that would serve only an 18th-century economy."'30
Justice Kennedy further stressed the significance of federalism within
the structure of the Constitution, asserting that the Framers understood
well that "a healthy balance of power between the States and the Federal
Government will reduce the risk of tyranny," thereby enhancing freedom.' 31 He also observed that federalism serves a utilitarian function,
allowing "the States [to] perform their role as laboratories for experimentation to devise various solutions where the best solution is far from
clear.""3 He concluded that section 922(q) went well beyond the scope
commerce power "is necessarily one of degree," thus supporting the notion that Commerce Clause analysis does not rest on precise formulations. Id. at 1633-34 (quoting
N.L.R.B. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel, 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937)).
124. Id.
125. Id. at 1634.
126. Justice O'Connor joined Justice Kennedy in his concurring opinion. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
127. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
128. Id. at 1637 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy referred to the distinction made between an activity's direct or indirect effect on interstate commerce, id.
at 1636 (Kennedy, J., concurring), as well as the differentiation of commercial activities from activities such as manufacturing, production, and mining. Id. at 1635 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
129. Id. at 1637 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
130. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
131. Id. at 1638 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (quoting Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S.
452, 458-59 (1991)).
132. Id. at 1641 (Kennedy, J., concurring). To support this contention, Justice Ken-
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of Congress' commerce power because it "forecloses the States from...
exercising their own judgment" in an area traditionally governed by the
States. In
2. Justice Thomas
Justice Thomas agreed with the majority's conclusion but wrote separately to express his view that the Court has strayed "far from the original understanding of the Commerce Clause. " " Justice Thomas especially criticized the "substantial effects" test, arguing that this standard is
far removed from the Constitution and from early case law." He further maintained that the "sweeping nature" of this test allows the dissent
to make its argument that Congress has the power to. regulate gun
possession."' Additionally, because of the aggregation principle' 37 of
this test, he reasoned that "if Congress passed an omnibus 'substantially
affects interstate commerce' statute, purporting to regulate every aspect
of human existence, the Act apparently would be constitutional""'--a
clear reductio ad absurdum.

nedy made reference to an amicus brief from the National Conference of State Legislatures et al., which attested that the "injection of federal officials into local problems
causes friction and diminishes political accountability of state and local governments."
Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
133. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
134. Id. at 1642 (Thomas, J., concurring).
135. Id. (Thomas, J., concurring). Justice Thomas began by tracing the etymology of
the word "commerce" and concluded that the word has a narrower meaning than
what case law suggests. Id. at 1643-44 (Thomas, J., concurring). He added that if the
Framers had wanted a 'substantially affects interstate commerce" clause, they would
have drafted one. Id. at 1644 (Thomas, J., concurring).
136. Id. at 1642 (Thomas, J., concurring). Justice Thomas also noted that many of
Congress' other enumerated powers under Article I, Section 8 are wholly superfluous
if the "substantial effects" test is used. Id. at 1644 (Thomas, J., concurring). Many of
these powers, he observed, deal with matters that substantially affect commerce, such
as the power to enact bankruptcy laws in Article I, Section 8, Clause 4. Id. (Thomas,
J., concurring).
137. The 'aggregation principle" states that "Congress can regulate whole categories
of activities that are not themselves either 'interstate' or 'commerce.'" Id. at 1650
(Thomas, J., concurring). Thus, in applying the substantial effects test, the Court asks
"whether the class of activities as a whole substantially affects interstate commerce,
not whether any specific activity within the class has such effects when considered
in isolation." Id. (Thomas, J., concurring).
138. Id. (Thomas, J., concurring).
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Justice Thomas also endeavored to refute Justice Steven's characterization of the Court's opinion as "radical."1" To the contrary, he asserted
that Lopez marks a return to the long-held understanding of the limited
nature of federal power.4 ' He further challenged the dissent's use of
precedent from the New Deal era, asserting that this case law was merely an innovation of the twentieth century and a dramatic departure from
150 years of precedent.' In conclusion, Justice Thomas insisted that
the Court must modify its Commerce Clause jurisprudence so that it conforms with the Framers' original understanding of federal authority.'42
C. The Dissents
1. Justice Stevens
Justice Stevens, in the shortest opinion of Lopez, expressed his agreement with the dissents of Justice Breyer and Justice Souter." In addition, he expressed his belief that Congress' power to regulate commerce
in firearms includes the power to outlaw gun possession at any location
and in any market, including the market for school-age children, "because of their potentially harmful use.""'
2. Justice Souter
In his dissent, Justice Souter faulted the majority for abandoning judicial restraint by not deferring to the "rationally based" judgments of Congress.' He characterized the Court's decision as a return to an untenable, pre-Depression conception of substantive due process and Commerce Clause interpretation." 6 He also expressed concerns that the

139. Id. at 1643 (Thomas, J., concurring).
140. Id. at 1646 (Thomas, J., concurring).
141. Id. at 1649 (Thomas, J., concurring).
142. Id. at 1650-51 (Thomas, J., concurring). For an enthusiastic endorsement of
Justice Thomas' approach, see Richard A. Epstein, Constitutional Faith and the Commerce Clause, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 167 (1996).
143. Id. at 1651 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
144. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1651 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens insinuated
that this market is substantial because firearm manufacturers specifically target young
children by distributing hunting-related videos to schools. Id. at 1651 n.* (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
145. Id. at 1651 (Souter, J., dissenting).
146. Id. at 1653 (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Souter noted that it was not by
mere coincidence that two weeks before the watershed case of Jones & Laughlin
Steel, which affirmed the expansion of congressional commerce power, see discussion
supra part IIC, a dramatic shift occurred in the Court's view of its authority under
the Due Process Clause. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1653 (Souter, J., dissenting) (referring to
the Court's rejection of a substantive due process challenge to a state law fixing min-
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majority's distinction between what is commercial and what is noncommercial resembles the old distinction between activities that directly or
indirectly affect interstate commerce.'47
Arguing d la Justice Harlan in Maryland v. Wirtz,'48 Justice Souter
rejected Chief Justice Rehnquist's position that education and criminal
law enforcement were areas over which states are historically
sovereign.' Justice Souter also addressed the role of legislative findings, stating that the Court has no duty to defer to such findings, but
pointing out that they may be a valuable reference for review."5 He
concluded by voicing his unequivocal support for the principal dissenting
opinion, asserting that Justice Breyer undoubtedly established that section 922(q) passed the rational basis test."'
3. Justice Breyer
In the Court's principal dissent, Justice Breyer'52 argued that section
922(q) fell well within the scope of congressional power as the Court had
interpreted it for almost sixty years." He reached this conclusion by
relying on three basic principles: (1) Congress may regulate local activities that "significantly" affect interstate commerce;" (2) in determining

imum wages for women and children in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S.
379 (1937)).

147. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1654 (Souter, J., dissenting).
148. 392 U.S. 183, 195-96 (1968) ("There is no general doctrine implied in the Federal Constitution that the two governments, national and state, are each to exercise its
powers so as not to interfere with the free and full exercise of the powers of the
other.").
149. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1654 (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Souter further expounded upon the "clear statement rule," which essentially is a device used by the
Court to avoid construing ambiguous legislation expansively. Id. at 1655 (Souter, J.,
dissenting). He stated that such rules of statutory interpretation are to be used only
when legislation leaves intent subject to question and should not be used as a source
of judicial activism. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).

150. Id. at 1656-57 (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Souter added that he saw no
reason not to consider Congress' retroactive findings. Id. at 1656 n.2 (Souter, J., dissenting).
151. Id. at 1657 (Souter, J., dissenting).
152. Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg joined Justice Breyer in his dissenting
opinion. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
153. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
154. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer maintained that the word "significant"
was more appropriate than "substantial," because "substantial" implies a somewhat
narrower power than recent precedent suggests." Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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whether a local activity has this significant effect, the Court must consider the cumulative effect of all similar instances;"' and (3) the Court
should judge only whether Congress had a rational basis for concluding
that the regulated activity significantly affected interstate commerce.'5
Thus, Justice Breyer maintained that the issue in Lopez should not have
been whether section 922(q) substantially affected interstate commerce,
but whether Congress had a rational basis for concluding that it did." 7
Citing numerous studies on guns in schools, Justice Breyer contended
that Congress did indeed have a rational basis to establish an empirical
connection between gun-related youth violence and interstate commerce." He deduced that guns in schools are a serious problem,
which, in turn, adversely impacts classroom learning. 9 He further argued that the quality of American education is directly linked to our
nation's economic growth."G Therefore, he concluded that gun possession in school zones substantially affects interstate commerce.'
Justice Breyer also addressed what he believed were three major legal
problems created by the majority ruling. 62 First, he asserted that the
majority's holding was irreconcilable with Supreme Court precedent,
which routinely upheld federal regulations despite having a lesser impact
on interstate commerce than school violence." Second, he rejected the
majority's distinction between commercial and noncommercial transac-

155. Id. at 1658 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 12728 (1942)).
156. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting). In essence, Justice Breyer was saying that the Court
should accord great deference to Congress. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
157. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
158. Id. at 1659-62 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer also included a lengthy
appendix of surveys and studies on violence. Id. at 1665-71 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
159. Id. at 1659 (Breyer, J., dissenting). He reasoned that guns in schools affect the
quality of education received by the students through the effect of violence on
teachers' ability to teach, students' ability to learn, and even the challenge of students to stay in school. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
160. Id. 1659-60 (Breyer, J., dissenting). He made the connection between education
and economic growth by discussing the effect of education on a business world that
is becoming more technologically advanced, on increasing global competition, and on
business location decisions. Id. at 1660-61 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
161. Id. at 1661 (Breyer, J., dissenting). He further suggested that if § 922(q) were
upheld, the scope of the commerce power would not be expanded; "[riather, it simply would apply preexisting law to changing economic circumstances." Id. at 1662
(Breyer, J., dissenting). Chief Justice Rehnquist sharply attacked this reasoning. See
supra notes 118-19 and accompanying text.
162. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1662-65 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
163. Id. at 1662 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146,
154 (1971) (upholding a federal statute making loansharking a crime); Katzenbach v.
McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 300 (1964) (upholding a federal statute prohibiting racial discrimination at local restaurants)).
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tions." He argued that earlier cases had rejected such distinctions,'"
and, even if a separation could be made, schools could reasonably fall
within the commercial category."6 Third, he maintained that the majority threatened legal uncertainty in an area of law that was well set"
tled. 67
' In summary, he would have upheld section 922(q) as constitutional so as to allow Congress to act in terns of "economic realities.""
V. IMPACT OF THE COURT'S DECISION

A. Judicial Impact
The most immediate impact of Lopez was to resolve an intercircuit
dispute over the constitutionality of section 922(q).'69 A broader implication is that Lopez will provide guidance to the lower courts in their
interpretation of federal power. The next conundrum is whether Lopez
actually offers a meaningful definition of the commerce power and
whether the lower courts can apply this definition with any consistency.
1. Can the Commerce Power Be Meaningfully Defined after Lopez?
Lopez limited the scope of Congress' commerce power to three broad
categories of activity: (1) "the use of the channels of interstate commerce;" (2) "the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or
things in interstate commerce, even though the threat may come only
from intrastate activities;" and (3) activities that "substantially affect
interstate commerce." 7 ' The first two categories are fairly straightforward: Congress may regulate commercial channels, such as highways,

164. Id. at 1663-64 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
165. Id. at 1663 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing, inter alia, Wickard v. Filburn, 317
U.S. 111, 120 (1942) (rejecting the distinction between "direct" and "indirect" effects);
United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 116-17 (1941) (overturning the distinction between "production" and "commerce")).
166. Id. at 1664 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
167. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting). Of course, the case law from the last two decades

cannot really be characterized as "well settled." See discussion supra part II.D. Another flaw in Justice Breyer's argument is that he seems to suggest that the Court
should ignore jurisprudential errors simply because they have become entrenched in
the legal system. See Epstein, supra note 7, at 1387 (arguing that Congress and the
courts cannot disregard the tension between modem commerce clause jurisprudence
and the original constitutional understanding).

168. Lopez, 115 S. CL at 1665 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
169. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
170. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1629-30; see discussion supra part IV.A.
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waterways, and air traffic; it may also regulate and protect instrumentalities within those channels, such as people, machines, and vehicles."'
The third category, as the Court readily admitted, is more nebulous.'
Nevertheless, the Court gave some hints as to what is required for a
federal statute in this third category to be upheld as a valid exercise of
Congress' commerce power.'73
The Court emphasized that a regulated activity's impact on interstate
commerce must be substantial and not merely incidental.'74 The Court
also seemed to make clear that when Congress exercises its commerce
authority, the regulations it promulgates must have some real connection
to commercial or economic activity.' 5 Of course, this commercial-noncommercial distinction is not likely to be clear-cut in each case. It may
be inferred from Lopez, however, that any connection to economic activity must at least be more obvious than the link between guns in
schools and interstate commerce.'76
The Court also implied that for a federal statute to be upheld it should
be free from the two fatal flaws found in section 922(q): first, the statute
"contain[ed] no jurisdictional element which would ensure, through caseby-case inquiry, that the firearm possession in question affect[ed] interstate commerce;" and second, Congress made no formal findings "regarding the effects upon interstate commerce of gun possession in a school
zone."'77 The majority ruling does not state that the presence of a jurisdictional nexus is conclusive of a statute's validity, but the absence of
any such nexus would appear to raise serious questions as to whether

171. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1629-30.
172. Id. at 1630; see notes 120-23 and accompanying text.

173. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1630.
174. Id.; see supra note 110 and accompanying text. Congress may not "use a relatively trivial impact on commerce as an excuse for broad general regulation of state
or private activities." Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1630 (citing Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S.
183, 196 n.27 (1968), overruled by National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833
(1976), overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 546-47
(1985)). However, Congress may still regulate an activity that has a trivial impact on
interstate commerce so long as the "cumulative effect" of the activity substantially affects interstate commerce. Id. at 1630-31 (citing Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111
(1942)).
175. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1630-31.
176. If, on the other hand, the Court were to adopt Justice Thomas' narrow definition of commerce, regulation would be limited to trade or the actual exchange of
goods or services. Id. at 1643-44 (Thomas, J., concurring). The obvious difficulty with
this definition is that it would require the dismantling of massive portions of the
modern federal government and would drastically impair the doctrine of stare decisis.
See Epstein, supra note 7, at 1387 ("[Tloo much water has passed over the darn for
there to be a candid judicial reexamination of the commerce clause that looks only
to first principles.").
177. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1631-32.
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the law goes beyond the enumerated power under which it was enacted.' 8 With regard to congressional findings, the Court recognized that
while such findings are not dispositive, they may have some relevance in
establishing a link to interstate commerce.'79
Finally, Lopez recognized that states have historically possessed primary authority for regulating areas such as criminal law, family law, and
education." The Court asserted that if it placed no limits on Congress'
commerce power, then the federal government would usurp these traditional state functions and thereby undermine the structural guarantee of
freedom. 8' It is unlikely that Lopez goes so far as to prohibit direct federal regulation of traditional state functions, especially given that the
Court rejected such an approach in Garciav. San Antonio Metropolitan
Transit Authority. However, if a federal statute regulated an activity
that has traditionally been the subject of state control, the Court is perhaps more likely to find the law invalid." This is particularly true if the
federal regulation disrupts the federal-state balance by foreclosing the
states from "perform[ing] their role as laboratories for experimentation
to devise various solutions where the best solution is far from clear.""
Interestingly, the Court acknowledged that it will uphold a federal
statute enacted under the commerce power so long as there is a "rational
basis" for finding a substantial effect on interstate commerce.' In
Lopez, the Court evidently found no such rational basis, emphasizing the
lack of congressional findings and the distinguishable characteristics of
prior case law." This reasoning appears to have digressed from the
standard rational basis approach, in which the Court is highly deferential

178. Id. at 1631.
179. Id. at 1631-32.

180. Id. at 1632-33.
181. Id. Preventing the accumulation of excessive power in the federal government
reduces the risk of tyranny and thus enhances freedom. Id. at 1626 (citing Gregory v.
Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991)).
182. 469 U.S. 528, 546-47 (1985), overruiing National League of Cities v. Usery, 426
U.S. 833 (1976).
183. See supra part I.D, discussing New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
184. Lopez, 115 S.Ct. at 1641 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
185. Id. at 1629. Note, however, that the majority ruling only mentioned the rational
basis test once throughout the opinion. Id. Moreover, the Court mentioned the test
not to show that the Court's review of congressional action was perfunctory, but
rather as an example of the Court's continued recognition of the limits of Congress'
commerce authority and of the Court's willingness to enforce those limits through
judicial review. Id.
186. Id. at 1629-34.
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to congressional actions.'87 Instead, the Court seems to have replaced
this test with a tougher standard." Hence, it is no longer likely that
courts will routinely sign off on the issue of whether Congress exceeded
the scope of its power.
2. Lopez in the Lower Courts
The precedential value of Lopez remains uncertain. Some commentators insist that the decision will have only a trivial impact," while others suggest that Lopez may have far-reaching consequences.'" Several
courts have analyzed statutes under Lopez in the months since the decision. While most courts have upheld a wide variety of federal regulations
by construing Lopez narrowly,"' the courts are not without dissention.'"

187. See United States v. Lopez, 2 F.3d 1342, 1363 n.43 (5th Cir. 1993) ("[N]o Supreme Court decision in the last half century ... has set aside (a congressional
enactment based on the Commerce Clause] as without rational basis.").
188. See Epstein, supra note 142, at 189 (characterizing Lopez' rational basis test as
"rational basis with a bite" and asserting that the proper standard of review is intermediate scrutiny); Deborah Jones Merritt, Symposium-Reflections on United States v.
Lopez: Commerce!, 94 MICH. L. REv. 674, 682 (1995) (observing that Lopez' version of
the rational basis test involved a heightened scrutiny).
189. See Lino A. Graglia, Case Studies, NAT'L REV., June 26, 1995, at 32 (opining
that Lopez will doubtfully have any precedential impact and that gun possession in
school zones "can easily and probably soon will be made a federal crime again").
190. See David G. Savage, High Court to Rule on Law Barring Guns Near Schools,
L.A. TIMES, Apr. 19, 1994, at A17 (stating that Lopez has the potential of inhibiting
Congress' power); Arthur Schlesinger Jr., Board of Contributors: In Defense of Government, WALL ST. J., June 7, 1995, at A14 (arguing that "the Supreme Court even
seems to want to replace the Constitution by the Articles of Confederation").
191. See, e.g., Kelley v. United States, 69 F.3d 1503, 1507-08 (10th Cir. 1995) (Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act); United States v. Bolton, 68 F.3d 396,
399 (10th Cir. 1995) (Hobbs Act); Mack v. United States, 66 F.3d 1025, 1028 (9th Cir.
1995) (Brady Act); United States v. Leshuk, 65 F.3d 1105, 1111-12 (4th Cir. 1995)
(Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act); United States v. Oliver, 60 F.3d 547, 550
(9th Cir. 1995) (Anti Car Theft Act); Cheffer v. Reno, 55 F.3d 1517, 1520-21 (11th Cir.
1995) (Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act); United States v. Hinton, No. 955095, 1995 WL 623876, at *2 (4th Cir. 1995) (per curiam) (federal statute prohibiting
felons from possessing a firearm that has moved in interstate commerce).
192. See, e.g., United States v. Kirk, 70 F.3d 791, 795 (5th Cir. 1995) (Jones, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that the court's validation of a statute which prohibits the possession of machine guns is inconsistent with the logic of Lopez); see also Cargill, Inc.
v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 407 (1995), denying cert. to Leslie Salt Co. v. United
States, 55 F.3d 1388 (9th Cir. 1995). In Cargill, the U.S. Supreme Court declined to
review a case involving wetlands regulations. Id. at 407. Justice Thomas dissented in
the denial of certiorari, stating that the statute in question, which regulated any waters that might serve as a potential habitat for migratory birds, including private
lands with occasional rainwater ponds, was even more far-fetched than the statute in
Lopez. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting). For an in-depth Commerce Clause analysis of this
case, see John A. Leman, Comment, The Birds: Regulation of Isolated Wetlands and
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For example, federal district courts are split with regard to the constitutionality of the Child Support Recovery Act,' which made it a federal offense to willfully withhold an overdue support obligation from a
child residing in another state. Some courts have invalidated the statute
as beyond the scope of the commerce power and in violation of the principles of federalism." In particular, these courts have observed that
Lopez explicitly singled out federal regulation of family law matters, such
as child custody, as an unreasonable encroachment on state sovereign"
ty. 95
' Other courts have upheld the statute, asserting that the regulation
of child support payments has a substantial effect on the national
economy." Their conclusion is based on the fact that Congress produced an abundance of legislative history regarding such economic effects and that the statute ensures, on a case-by-case basis, a jurisdictional nexus to interstate commercial activity.' 7
The cases upholding the Child Support Recovery Act appear to run
contrary to the underlying spirit of Lopez, which endeavored to hold
Congress to its constitutional limits and to restore some balance to the
power relationship between the federal and state governments." However, as Justice Thomas foreshadowed in his concurrence in Lopez, the
analytically boundless nature of the "substantial effects" test encourages
decisions which are inconsistent with the principles espoused in
Lopez," so it is perhaps not surprising that courts are confused.
It also should be noted that courts do not necessarily have to invalidate a federal statute to prevent a significant intrusion on the traditional
federal-state balance. A Ninth Circuit case °° involving a federal arson

the Limits of the Commerce Clause, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1237 (1995).
193. 18 U.S.C. § 228 (1995).
194. See United States v. Mussari, 894 F. Supp. 1360, 1368 (D. Ariz. 1995); United
States v. Schroeder, 894 F. Supp. 360, 368-69 (D. Ariz. 1995); United States v. Bailey,
902 F. Supp. 727, 730 (W.D. Tex. 1995).
195. See Mussari, 894 F. Supp. at 1364; Schroeder, 894 F. Supp. at 365; Bailey, 902
F. Supp. at 728; see also Anne C. Dailey, Federalism and Families, 143 U. PA. L.
REv. 1787 (1995) (examining the resurgence of federalism into the realm of law governing domestic relations).
196. See United States v. Hampshire, 892 F. Supp. 1327, 1330 (D. Kan. 1995); United
States v. Sage, 906 F. Supp. 84, 88-89 (D. Conn. 1995).
197. See Hampshire, 892 F. Supp. at 1329-30; Sage, 906 F. Supp. at 90-91.
198. United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1634 (1995).
199. Id. at 1650 (Thomas, J., concurring).
200. United States v. Pappadopoulos, 64 F.3d 522 (9th Cir. 1995). In Pappadopoulos,
the government argued that federal jurisdiction was conferred upon an arson prosecution because the private residence that was destroyed acquired natural gas from out-
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statute2"' is illustrative in this regard. Like the statute at issue in Lopez,
the activity regulated by the arson statute was noncommercial in nature
and Congress revealed no connection to interstate commerce.0 " Unlike
Lopez, however, the arson statute contained a jurisdictional element that
required, in each case, a connection to interstate commerce.2 ' Rather
than invalidate the law, the court merely overturned the conviction on
grounds that the jurisdictional requirement was not satisfied.2"' Thus,
courts have the option of using narrow statutory construction to remain
true to the values of Lopez.
In the long run, one benefit of the Lopez decision is that it may curb
the flooding of criminal litigation in the federal courts."5 In light of this
situation, one must pause to consider the ramifications had Justice
Breyer's opinion been the majority.2" The result would have been a
continued burden on the federal courts, as well as an invitation for Congress to federalize even more criminal law.20 7
B.

Legislative Impact

Concerns that Lopez will put a "major crimp in Congress' power" 2°
are overstated. As Justice Kennedy noted, the Court's holding was limited.2° However, Lopez will probably affect the manner in which Con-

of-state sources. Id. at 525. The court held that this was an insufficient connection to
interstate commerce. Id. at 527.
201. 18 U.S.C. § 844(i) (1995).
202. Pappadopoulos, 64 F.3d at 527.

203. Id.
204. Id. at 526.

205. Chippendale, supra note 4, at 456. ("Criminal cases now consume half of the
federal judiciary's total time, and criminal trials account for eighty percent of the
caseload in some districts."). The Lopez decision should curtail this judicial backlog
by discouraging federal prosecutions of local crime.
206. This situation is not so implausible given the Court's five-to-four split. It also
should be noted that the Lopez decision says a great deal about the influence of the
conservative wing on the Rehnquist Court. As vacancies arise, the selection of new
justices with potentially different philosophies will certainly affect the stability of the
Court's federalist sympathies. For a discussion of the Court's current ideological dynamics, see Joan Biskupic, When Court Is Split, Kennedy Rules; On Key Pending
Appeals, He and O'ConnorAre Justices to Follow, WASH. POST, June 11, 1995, at A14.
207. See Rachel J. Littman, Comment, Gun-Free Schools: Constitutional Powers,
Limitations, and Social Policy Concerns Surrounding Federal Regulation of Fire-

arms in School, 5 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 723, 757 (1995) (arguing that if the Court
were to uphold § 922(q), the implications would be "severe and far-reaching," significantly eroding the Tenth Amendment).
208. Savage, supra note 190, at A17; cf. Schlesinger Jr., supra note 190, at 14 (arguing that the Supreme Court made an "assault on the national government").
209. United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1634 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Note also that Chief Justice Rehnquist, in the majority opinion, referred to precedents
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gress passes legislation, as well as what type of legislation it introduces.
The fact that Chief Justice Rehnquist noted the lack of legislative
findings establishing a connection between gun possession in school
zones and interstate commerce will presumably cause Congress to be
more thorough in its formal findings." ' In addition, Congress will likely
be more cautious when exercising its commerce power to regulate noncommercial activities. For instance, when enacting a criminal statute that
targets local activity, Congress might limit the statute's scope to such
activity with a clear nexus to interstate commerce.'
If, in fact, Lopez prevents enforcement of other federal laws, that is
not to say that the federal government would be powerless. Congress
always has the option of regulating through its spending power.2"2 Thus,
even though Congress cannot exercise its commerce power to control
gun possession in school zones, it could still exercise its spending power
by offering states federal funds in exchange for adopting gun-free school
policies."3
In sum, Congress may have to rethink its belief that it has the authority to intervene in every national problem.1 It is worth noting that the

such as Hodel, Perez, McClung, Heart of Atlanta Motel, and Wickard, to demonstrate

a pattern of cases in which regulated activities substantially affected interstate commerce. See supra note 111 and accompanying text. Although these precedents are
generally regarded as greatly expansive of federal authority, the majority would have
upheld them under the "substantial effect" test. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1630. Furthermore, it should be pointed out that McClung and Heart of Atlanta Motel would likely
be upheld also as fitting Justice Rehnquist's second category of activity subject to
regulation: persons or things in interstate commerce.
210. Another consequence might be that Congress, when passing legislation, will
include findings composed of "boilerplate" language. David S. Gehrig, Note, The GunFree School Zones Act: The Shootout over Legislative Findings, the Commerce
Clause, and Federalism, 22 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 179, 205-06 (1994).
211. See Chippendale, supra note 4, at 479 (observing that a caijacking statute Congress was considering presented an opportunity to stop automobile theft "when combined with the movement of the stolen car or its parts across state lines").
212. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1, provides Congress with the broad power to spend
"for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States."
213. See, e.g., South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206 (1987) (holding that Congress
may regulate indirectly by using its spending power to promote uniformity in state
drinking ages); see also Littman, supra note 207 at 760 (asserting that this method of
indirect legislation achieved success in "Goals 2000," a project in which Congress
used monetary incentives to encourage local communities to put together their own
anti-violence programs).
214. Part of this belief stems from the political pressures on members of Congress
to be regarded as "tough on crime." See Gehrig, supra note 210, at 214 (stating that
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Lopez decision comes at a time when people are increasingly disenchanted with centralized government, and states are challenging unfunded
federal mandates." 5 What is more, several prominent national political
leaders are echoing these sentiments."6 Thus, in the aftermath of
Lopez, Congress might refrain from exercising its commerce power in
enacting new laws and, perhaps, might even dismantle existing regulatory
agencies." '
C. Social Impact
Justice Breyer characterized the majority's invalidation of section
922(q) as a serious threat to the social well-being of Americans," 8 but
this is more a matter of perception than reality.2"' In fact, there is no
real evidence that augmenting the federal contribution to criminal law

such pressures weaken the theory that states should be able to rely on the national
political process to prevent Congress from eroding state sovereignty). The result is
that Congress is driven to federalize such "headline" crimes as caijacking, as well as
such seemingly local offenses as arson. Chippendale, supra note 4, at 463-65.
215. See TRIBE, supra note 30, § 5-22 (asserting that, since the mid-1970s, the national mood has disfavored big government and preferred local autonomy); John
Kincald, The New Federalism Context of the New Judicial Federalism, 26 RUTGERS
L.J. 913, 913 (1995) (observing that the "new judicial federalism" has emerged during
the "new political federalisms" of the past thirty years); Kmiec, supra note 18, at 6
(observing that various states are challenging unfunded mandates); George F. Will,
Events and Arguments: Modern life is imparting fresh momentum to an old vision
of constitutional values, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 16, 1995, at 88 (arguing that the Framers'
constitutional vision of limited government is being rejuvenated).
216. See Ann Devroy & Helen Dewar, Hailing Bipartisanship,Clinton Signs Bill to
Restrict Unfunded Mandates, WASH. POST, Mar. 23, 1995, at A10 (reporting that President Clinton signed into law a bill to restrict the imposition of unfunded mandates
upon the states); Helen Dewar, Senate Votes to Limit Unfunded Mandates, WASH.
PoST, Jan. 28, 1995, at Al (describing a bill to limit unfunded mandates as a "key
part of the GOP effort to shrink the federal government and return power, responsibilities and dollars to states and municipalities"); Jerry Gray, Welfare--G.O.P. Governors Make Their Pitch, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7, 1995, at A8 (reporting that House Speaker
Gingrich and Senate Majority Leader Dole focused on the Tenth Amendment when
they met with Republican governors to discuss legislative goals).
217. See, e.g., Regulatory Transition Act of 1995, H.R. 450, 104th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1995) (providing a regulatory moratorium); Risk Assessment and Cost-Benefit
Analysis Act of 1995, H.R. 690, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) (seeking to restrain federal regulation); see also Christopher Georges, Senate Republicans Begin to Give Details on Spending Cuts They Intend to Seek, WALL ST. J., Mar. 13, 1995, at A4 (reporting that Senator Gramm of Texas and Senate Majority Leader Dole have separately proposed abolishing the Department of Education).
218. United States v. Lopez, 115 S.Ct. 1624, 1665 (1995) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
219. Justice Breyer appears to obscure the negative effect of gun-related school
violence, which is arguably substantial, see supra note 1 and accompanying text, with
the negative effect resulting from § 922(q)'s nullification, which is arguably nonexistent.
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enforcement has reduced the crime rate.22 ° It is even arguable that the
increasing number of state laws responding to school violence makes
section 922(q) unnecessary. In addition, given that increased federal
regulation often leads to detrimental effects on the national economy,
there are indeed benefits derived from decentralization. 2 As Professor
Epstein observed, "The great peril of national regulation is that it may be
taken too far, to impose
national uniformity which frustrates, rather than
2
facilitates markets."

1

If Lopez and the surrounding political climate results in a rollback of
the modem federal government, those hurt will be those with the greatest reliance interests in the status quo.' For example, gun control proponents will most likely view the Lopez decision as a significant setback,

220. See Chippendale, supra note 4, at 467 (citing David Masci, Long Arm of Federal Law Keeps Stretching, ORLANDO SENTINEL TRIB., Dec. 6, 1992, at G1; Paul M.
Barrett, Clinton Wants to Broaden Federal Fight Against Crime, but Strategy has
Critics, WALL

ST.

J., Mar. 12, 1993, at A10). Chippendale discusses three factors to

explain why the expanding criminal code has failed to reduce the crime rate. Id.
First, he asserts that the inconsistent enforcement of federal criminal statutes creates
no deterrent effect. Id. at 467-68. Second, he argues that the blurred division of authority is less efficient and dilutes law enforcement resources. Id. at 468-69. Third, he
maintains that national uniformity of federal criminal law stifles state innovation. Id.
at 469-70.
221. Julius Menacker & Richard Mertz, State Legislative Responses to School Crime,
85 ED. LAW REP. 1, 1 (1993) (noting that at least thirty-six states had passed legisla-

tion responding to school violence concerns); see Littman, supra note 207, at 770.
Littman offered the following hypothetical to support the idea that states are better
suited to enforce criminal laws:
[A] community school might wish to give a first-offender student who is
found with a gun and who has little understanding of its potential danger a
comprehensive and educational form of punishment. On the other hand, a
local authority may choose to enforce a more severe punishment on a recidivist youth who is caught with a weapon intended for a gang fight. These two
offenders, however different they appear to be, would fall equally within the
net of a federal school gun law and perhaps frustrate the efforts of a community concerned with education and rehabilitation. In essence, the federal
law would treat students no differently than the guns they possess.
Id. at 768-69.
222. See generally George Roche, AMERICA BY THE THROAT: THE STRANGLEHOLD OF
FEDERAL BUREAUCRACY (1985) (documenting numerous examples of bureaucratic bungling, where good intentions led to disastrous results).
223. Epstein, supra note 7, at 1454; see Will, supra note 215, at 38 ("Centrally designed and controlled social policies no longer imply rationality and fairness but 'bureaucracy, Kafkaesque regulation and one-size-fits-all mass production.'").
224. Epstein, supra note 7, at 1455.
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given that Congress had used its commerce power to enact almost all of
its gun control laws.225 On the other hand, organizations such as the
National Rifle Association may, in light of the Lopez ruling, turn from
their usual reliance on the Second Amendment to combat federal gun
control laws and begin focusing more on the Tenth Amendment.226
In summary, the Court's ruling in Lopez will discourage those who feel
that an expansive federal role is needed to address national social
ills, '27 while those who believe that the growth of federal power has become too overwhelming will welcome the decision.2
VI. CONCLUSION

In United States v. Lopez, the Supreme Court held that Congress had
no authority to determine whether guns would be allowed near school
grounds in Texas-that decision, said the Court, was up to Texas. As a
result, artificial respiration was given to the Tenth Amendment, which
until recently might as well have been repealed. Given the five to four
decision of Lopez, coupled with the Court's inconsistent interpretations
over the last two decades, it is still too soon to know whether the
Court's newfound reverence for state sovereignty will endure.
The Court could have decided Lopez differently, consistent with the
modem trend of allowing great deference to congressional actions. However, instead of turning the Commerce Clause into a general police power, the Court declared that the commerce power is not without limits.
This ruling undoubtedly gives rise to legal uncertainty, but, as Chief Justice Rehnquist noted, any advantage derived from eliminating this uncer-

225. Littman, supra note 207, at 745 n.91.
226. Interestingly, the Second Amendment, which provides, "A well regulated Militia,
being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and
bear Arms, shall not be infringed," U.S. CONST. amend. II, has not played a significant
role in the challenges to federal gun control legislation. See Giller, supra note 10, at
153. Rather, judicial review of these laws generally focuses on whether Congress has
properly exercised its authority under the Commerce Clause. See id.
227. See Gehrig, supra note 210, at 180 (arguing that the social problems of our
country are often national in scope and require solutions from the federal government).
228. See Chippendale, supra note 4, at 474 (asserting that accumulation of federal
criminal statutes disrupts the jurisdictional balance between the federal and state
governments and, "if left unchanged, will damage the federal courts").
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tainty would be at the expense of the Constitution's delicate system of
enumerated powers. 2 9
ERIC W. HAGEN

229. United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1633 (1995).
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